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PROBATE LAW
I. COURT REQUIRES CLAIMANTS TO KNOWINGLY WAIVE ELECTIVE
SHARE RIGHTS AND UPHOLDS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ELECTIVE
SHARE PROVISION
In In re Patrick1 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
under section 62-2-204 of the South Carolina Code2 claimants must
knowingly waive their rights to an elective share.3 The supreme court
also upheld the constitutionality of section 62-2-201's elective share
provision 4 and held that article XVII, section 9 of the South Carolina
Constitution,5 as applied, violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause.6
Murray Patrick's wife, from whom he was separated when she exe-
cuted her will, died testate. Mrs. Patrick devised one dollar to her hus-
band and the remainder of her estate to her children. Thereafter, Mur-
ray claimed and was awarded his elective share. On appeal Mrs.
Patrick's children argued that Murray waived his right to elective
share when he conveyed his one-half interest in the home to his wife
and sent her a letter which indicated that he would convey his interest
to her if she would reconcile. The children also argued that the elective
share provision violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.7 The court rejected both of these contentions.
The court based its holding that Murray did not waive his right to
elective share on three grounds: no evidence in the record indicated
that Murray knowingly waived his right to elective share, the legisla-
ture did not enact the elective share provision until after Murray wrote
the letter, and Murray and his wife reconciled after Murray wrote the
1. 402 S.E.2d 664 (S.C. 1991).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-204 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
3. Patrick, 402 S.E.2d at 665.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-201 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1990).
5. S.C. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 9. The section provides:
The real and personal property of a woman held at the time of her mar-
riage, or that which she may thereafter acquire, either by gift, grant, inheri-
tance, devise or otherwise, shall be her separate property, and she shall have
all the rights incident to the same to which an unmarried woman or a man is
entitled. She shall have the power to contract and be contracted with in the
same manner as if she were unmarried.
Id.
6. Patrick, 402 S.E.2d at 666.
7. Id. at 665.
1
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letter.8 However, the first ground on which the court relied may be
erroneous because the plain meaning of section 62-2-204 does not re-
quire that claimants knowingly waive their rights to an elective share.
Section 62-2-204 provides:
The right of election . .. may be waived, wholly or partially,
before or after marriage, by a written contract, agreement, or waiver
signed by the party waiving after fair disclosure. Unless it provides to
the contrary, a waiver of all rights in the property or estate of a pre-
sent or prospective spouse or a complete property settlement entered
into after or in anticipation of separation or divorce is a waiver of all
rights to elective share .... 11
If Murray's letter or conveyance of his one-half interest in the home
was either a waiver of all rights in his wife's property or a complete
property settlement, the requirements of section 62-2-204 would be
met. Any reasonable application of the statute's plain meaning there-
fore would require a court to hold that Murray waived his right to elec-
tive share.
Moreover, when the Colorado Court of Appeals applied a statute
almost identical to section 62-2-204, it held that "[b]y virtue of the
statute, the waiver is now deemed to arise from a property settlement
which completely disposes of the spouses' property and fails specifi-
cally to provide that it does not constitute waiver of all rights to elec-
tive share."'1 Thus, the Patrick court's holding also is inconsistent with
authority from other jurisdictions.
The real issue is whether Murray's conveyance or letter consti-
tuted either a waiver of all rights in the property or a complete prop-
erty settlement. Other courts have held that a property settlement
agreement waives the right to elective share only if it purports to con-
clude all marital rights and effect a full settlement of every item of
property owned by the parties." Therefore, because the home was not
the only property of the estate, Murray's conveyance of his interest in
the home was neither a waiver of all rights in the property of the estate
nor a complete property settlement. Although Murray promised to sign
all the property over to his wife, it also is questionable whether a mere
promise in a signed letter was the complete agreement between the
parties or a waiver of all rights in the property. Furthermore, Murray
wrote the letter in anticipation of reconciliation and not "in anticipa-
8. Id.
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-204 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
10. In re Estate of Morrell, 687 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); accord In re
Estate of Messer, 118 Ariz. 291, 293-94, 576 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Ct. App. 1978).
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tion of separation or divorce. '12
Section 62-2-204 does allow a waiver of the right to elective share
without a waiver of all rights in the property of the estate or a com-
plete property settlement agreement. However, under almost identical
statutes, courts from other jurisdictions require the following: The
waiver is a written contract or agreement, the party waiving the elec-
tive share signs the waiver, and there is fair disclosure of the party's
interest in the estate.13 Therefore, the Patrick court should not have
held that there was no waiver because nothing in the record indicated
that Murray knew he was waiving his right to elective share. Instead,
the court should have held that Murray did not waive his right to elec-
tive share because neither his letter nor his conveyance constituted a
complete settlement of all property, a waiver of all of his rights in the
property, or a written contract waiving his right to elective share.
Because "Article XVII, Section 9 provides married women with
the same rights as unmarried women over the disposition of their prop-
erty and the elective share provision restricts the rights of married
women,"1 the court had to address the constitutionality of the elective
share provision. In holding that article XVII, section 9 violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution," the court
did not analyze or cite any federal authority; nonetheless, the decision
is consistent with South Carolina precedent16 that is based on the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Orr v. Orr.'1
In Orr the Court held that a state statute which required hus-
bands but not wives to pay alimony upon divorce violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 8 The Court reaf-
firmed that "'[tlo withstand scrutiny' under the Equal Protection
Clause, 'classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.' "9 The Court reaffirmed that the "'[r]eduction of the dis-
parity in economic condition between men and women caused by the
long history of discrimination against women [is] an important govern-
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-204 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
13. Ruzic v. Ruzic, 549 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 1989); In re Estate of Tapper, 432 So. 2d
135, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The Tapper court also required that under this stan-
dard the claimant must knowingly agree to waive the right to elective share. 432 So. 2d
at 136.
14. In re Patrick, 402 S.E.2d 664, 666 (S.C. 1991).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. Boan v. Watson, 281 S.C. 516, 316 S.E.2d 401 (1984).
17. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
18. Id. at 278-83.
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mental objective.' "20 However, the Court held that the statute's classi-
fication by gender was not substantially related to the objective of re-
ducing the economic disparity between women and men because the
statute in question already provided for individualized hearings to de-
termine need.21 Therefore, the Patrick court's blanket statement that
"[t]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohib-
its discrimination based upon gender" 22 is misleading,23 and in certain
circumstances a statute may discriminate on the basis of gender.2'
Although the supreme court probably reached the correct result on
both issues, it misapplied both the plain meaning of the elective share
provision and United States Supreme Court decisions regarding gen-
der-based discrimination. More importantly, this decision erroneously
provides the basis for granting a claimant a right to elective share
solely because the claimant did not knowingly waive the right.
Perry Mason Hogue, Jr.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IMPOSED ON PROPERTY APPOINTED BY WIFE
IN VIOLATION OF PROMISE TO HUSBAND
In Chapman v. Citizens & Southern National Bank25 the South
Carolina Court of Appeals held that a confidential relationship existed
between spouses and imposed a constructive trust on property that a
husband had devised to his wife because the wife's exercise of her
20. Id. at 280 (first alteration by Court) (quoting Califano, 430 U.S. at 317).
21. Id. at 281-82.
22. In re Patrick, 402 S.E.2d 664, 666 (S.C. 1991).
23. The Patrick case is not the first decision in which the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution mandates
the elimination of gender-based discrimination. This notion results from the court's in-
terpretation of Orr in Boan v. Watson, 281 S.C. 516, 316 S.E.2d 401 (1984). In Boan the
court held that the Orr "principle is equally applicable to the property rights of hus-
bands and wives on the termination of a marriage by death." Id. at 519, 316 S.E.2d at
402-03. The court did not apply the gender-based test articulated in Orr and held that
the common-law right of dower in South Carolina violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. As a result, it implied that Orr requires the elimination of gender-based
discrimination.
24. For example, in Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)(per curiam), the Court
upheld a section of the Social Security Act that allowed a female to exclude three more
low earning years than a male when calculating an average monthly wage. As a result, a
female received greater social security benefits in comparison to a similarly situated
male. The Court noted that the statute was specifically enacted to remedy wage and job
discrimination against women, id. at 318-20, and that Congress intended "to compensate
for past employment discrimination against women," id. at 318.
25. 395 S.E.2d 446 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
1991]
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power of appointment over the property violated a promise she had
made to her husband.26
In 1948 Mr. and Mrs. Chapman married. Both were individually
wealthy with children from previous marriages. In 1958 Mr. Chapman
created a marital trust 27 that contained the couple's home and
furniture.
The testamentary trust gave Mrs. Chapman a life estate in the
property with a power of appointment exercisable upon her death..If
she failed to exercise the power of appointment, the property would
pass to Mr. Chapman's children. Letters of record revealed that the
Chapman's intentions concerning the trust property were not fully ex-
pressed in Mr. Chapman's will. Specifically, Mr. and Mrs. Chapman
agreed that Mrs. Chapman was to either make gifts of the property to
Mr. Chapman's children during her lifetime or allow the property to
pass to his children upon her death by declining to exercise her power
of appointment. 8
Mr. Chapman died in 1975 after a prolonged illness. Until her hus-
band's death Mrs. Chapman continually expressed "her hope and in-
tent to give as much of the marital trust as conditions would allow
directly to Mr. Chapman's issue."'29 Nevertheless, two years after Mr.
Chapman's death, she exercised her power of appointment in favor of
her own children. After Mrs. Chapman's death in 1986 Mr. Chapman's
children sought to have a constructive trust imposed for their benefit
upon the marital trust property Mrs. Chapman appointed to her own
children.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court and imposed a con-
structive trust on the property for the benefit of Mr. Chapman's chil-
dren. The court of appeals ruled that Mrs. Chapman breached her con-
fidential relationship with her husband by exercising her power of
appointment in favor of her own children.
30
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy designed to prevent
26. Id. at 450-52.
27.
[A] device in the form of a trust utilized to gain the maximum benefit of the
marital deduction by dividing the property in half. Commonly, one half of the
property is transferred to the marital deduction trust and the other half is
disposed of in a trust or like arrangement with a view towards having it escape
taxation in the estate of the surviving spouse.
BLAcK's LAw DxCTIONARY 968 (6th ed. 1990). As a result of a change in the law with
respect to the estate of decedents dying after 1981, the marital deduction trust is gener-
ally not used. See Chapman, 395 S.E.2d at 450 n.2.
28. Chapman, 395 S.E.2d at 449-50.
29. Id. at 450.
30. Id. at 452.
[Vol. 43
5
et al.: Probate Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1991
PROBATE LAW
unjust enrichment.3' Generally, courts impose constructive trusts in
contravention of express agreements because of a constructive or ac-
tual fraudulent breach of a confidential relationship that renders pos-
session of the property by one party unconscionable.2 A party that
petitions a court to impose a constructive trust may use parol evidence
"'despite the statute of frauds upon the high and long established
ground that the statute will not be permitted to shield a fraud.' ,,33
Nevertheless, the evidentiary standard is high. The party must present
clear and convincing evidence of wrongdoing before the court will im-
pose a constructive trust.3
4
The disagreement between the court of appeals and the trial court
in Chapman stemmed from their differing interpretations of All v.
Prillaman."5 In All the South Carolina Supreme Court refused to im-
pose a constructive trust on property that a mother devised to her son
because no proof existed that the son fraudulently made a promise to
induce his mother to convey the property to him, that the son in any
manner overreached his mother, or that the son abused any confiden-
tial relationship which may have existed between them. 8
The trial court reasoned that All controlled because Mr. Chap-
man's children had not shown that Mrs. Chapman acted with fraudu-
lent intent when Mr. Chapman created the marital trust." On the
other hand, the court of appeals found All inapplicable because the
Chapmans, unlike the mother and son in All, had a confidential
relationship.' 8
As the Chapman court noted, a person ordinarily has a confiden-
tial relationship with a family member .' Before a court will hold that a
confidential relationship exists, however, "the one in whom the trust or
confidence is reposed must possess the power to abuse the trust of the
confiding party . . . to the detriment of the confiding party."'40 Ad-
dressing the case at hand, the court of appeals stated:
31. 76 AM. Ju. 2D Trusts § 222 (1975); Faulkner v. Faulkner, 257 S.C. 172, 175-76,
184 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1971). Constructive trusts are not new to South Carolina law. For
an early example see McDonald v. Executors of May, 18 S.C. Eq. (1 Rich. Eq.) 91 (1844).
32. 76 AM. Ju. 2D Trusts § 221 (1975).
33. Briggs v. Richardson, 273 S.C. 376, 379, 256 S.E.2d 544, 545 (1979) (quoting
Wolfe v. Wolfe, 215 S.C. 530, 536, 56 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1949) (per curiam)).
34. SSI Medical Servs., Inc. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 500, 392 S.E.2d 789, 794 (1990)
(citing Briggs v. Richardson, 288 S.C. 537, 343 S.E.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1986)).
35. 200 S.C. 279, 20 S.E.2d 741 (1942).
36. Id. at 305, 20 S.E.2d at 752.
37. Chapman v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 395 S.E.2d 446, 449 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
38. Id. at 453.
39. Id. at 451 (citing All, 200 S.C. at 299, 20 S.E.2d at 750).
40. Id. Thus, the finding of a confidential relationship depends more upon the reli-
ance of the confiding party than simply the propinquity of the parties.
1991]
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[W]hen a husband or wife reposes in the other a trust to do or not do
an act relating to the corpus of his estate after his or her death a
confidential relationship shall be deemed to have existed if the one in
whom the confidence is reposed has the power to abuse the confidence
to his or her own advantage.
41
Mrs. Chapman's "absolute dominance" over the marital trust after Mr.
Chapman died created a confidential relationship between her and her
husband and, accordingly, precluded her from disposing of the trust
property in a manner contrary to her agreement with her husband.
42
The issue of whether a confidential relationship existed between a
testator and family members has long been a dilemma for South Caro-
lina courts.4 3 Chapman illuminates the circumstances under which
confidential relationships exist between family members. Nevertheless,
as long as heirs are dissatisfied with provisions of a will and believe a
confidential or fiduciary relationship existed between the testator and
the devisee, litigation that attempts to impose constructive trusts on




43. See, e.g., Faulkner v. Faulkner, 257 S.C. 172, 184 S.E.2d 718 (1971); Scott v.
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